Judicial disagreement need not be political: dissent on the Estonian Supreme Court by Hanretty, Chris
Judicial disagreement need not be
political: dissent on the Estonian
Supreme Court*
Chris Hanretty
I investigate the non-unanimous decisions of judges on the Estonian Supreme
Court. I argue that since judges on the court enjoy high de jure indepen-
dence, dissent frequently, and are integrated in the normal judicial hierar-
chy, the Estonian Supreme Court is a crucial case for the presumption that
judicial disagreement reveals policy preferences. I analyse dissenting opin-
ions using an ideal point response model. Examining the characteristics of
cases which discriminated with respect to the recovered dimension, I show
that this dimension cannot be interpreted as a meaningful policy dimension,
but instead reflects disagreement about the proper scope of constitutional
redress.
The study of apex courts – courts at the top of the judicial system of a country, whether
formally part of that system or are separate constitutional courts – is an increasingly im-
portant part of the study of the politics generally. To some extent, this is a result of simple
numerical growth in the number of apex courts in democratic systems (Romeu, 2006).
Countries which democratized in the early nineteen-nineties all opted to establish courts
to review the constitutionality of legislation with reference to constitutions embodying a
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variety of important human rights. (That is, no country was sufficiently inspired by the
United Kingdom to attempt a form of political constitutionalism: Bellamy (2007)). In each
of these countries, there has been a struggle for constitutional justice (Schwartz, 2000)
– and in some countries, this struggle has been more arduous than in others.
In the process of establishing such apex courts, institutional designers had to make a
number of different choices. One important choice was whether or not to permit the pub-
lication of dissenting opinions: opinions which disagree with the outcome or disposition
proposed by the majority (or in rarer cases a plurality) of the court. Amongst countries
which drew up constitutions following the end of the second world war, the trend was
against the publication of dissenting opinions. Thus, the Italian and French Constitu-
tional Courts do not issue dissenting opinions, but only brief and often gnomic decisions
of the court. Countries which democratised later – even countries which in other aspects
of institutional design closely followed French and Italian models – tended to permit dis-
senting opinions. It is this pattern which has been followed by most countries in Central
and Eastern Europe.
There are good reasons for banning dissent if one is concerned about a reputation
for judicial impartiality. There is a strong presumption, derived from the study of Ameri-
can courts, that judges are little more than “legislators in robes” (Shepsle and Bonchek,
1997, 418), and that this is particularly true for apex courts. Analyses of dissenting opin-
ions outside of the United States have tended to confirm this general impression (Alarie
and Green, 2007; Hanretty, 2012; Voeten, 2008). Where analyses have not revealed
a political element to judicial disagreement, it has been because judicial disagreement
does not express any particular substantive element at all, but rather a (differentially
distributed) propensity to disagree per se (Hanretty, 2013).
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that it is possible to find dissent on an
apex court which is structured by a substantively interesting particular latent dimension,
where that latent dimension is not itself political. Specifically, I find that dissent on the
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Estonian Supreme Court is characterised by disagreements over plaintiff-friendliness
which cannot be reduced to disagreements about left-right political issues, and which
are related to judges’ background in particular areas of law.
In the following section, I discuss some of the literature on judicial behaviour, and why
there is a strong expectation that patterns of judicial disagreement should be political
in nature. I then go on to describe the Estonian Supreme Court; its composition; its
caseload; and the types of dispute which it is called on to adjudicate. I analyse dissents
as if they were expressions of sincere voting along a single policy dimension, and then
analyse the cases which discriminte with respect to this recovered dimension. Through
quantitative and qualitative analysis of these cases, I argue for an interpretation of the
latent dimension as separate plaintiff-friendly judges from all other judges, and argue
that this does not signify ‘political’ judging. I close by reflecting on the reasons why the
Estonian Supreme Court is exceptional in this regard.
Why expect political judging?
First, there is a strong presumption that judges are policy-seekers. This view is most
prevalent in the United States, where “the issue of what drives judges is largely settled”
(Helmke and Sanders, 2006, 867), and where sets of measurements of judicial prefer-
ences along the left-right dimension (Martin and Quinn, 2002) are to judicial politics what
estimates of policy positions from manifestos are to the study of party politics. However,
the claim that judges are policy-seekers with respect to the left-right dimension has also
been made for judges on the French Conseil Constitutionnel and German Bundesver-
fassungsgericht (Honnige, 2009), the Italian Corte Costituzionale (Dalla Pellegrina and
Garoupa, 2013), and the Spanish and Portuguese Constitutional Tribunals (Hanretty,
2012). The claim that judges are policy-seekers with respect to other dimensions, in
particular the centre-periphery dimension, has also been made for the European Court
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of Justice (Malecki, 2012) and the European Court of Human Rights (Voeten, 2008).
Second, because of this strong presumption, where observable decisions do not war-
rant inferences about judges’ policy preferences, this is often assumed to be the result
of considerable constraints on judges’ action, which may result either from the threat of
policy reversal, or the threat of removal from office or non re-appointment. In particular,
judges may fear the threat of reversal by a notionally sovereign Parliament (Hanretty,
2013), or the threat of non-compliance on the part of other courts within the normal ju-
dicial system (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2012), or the threat of removal from office (Iaryc-
zower et al. (2002) and, to some extent, Basabe-Serrano (2012)), or simply have a
strong aversion to expressing disagreement (Hayakawa, 1964). All of these different
explanations for a lack of disagreement can be framed within a general theory of judicial
motivation (Helmke and Sanders, 2006).
Third, because there is a presumption that judges are policy-seekers whose ideal
points are made manifest through their observable decisions except when institutional
features mitigate against the expression of disagreement, a case study which shows that
judges do not seek policy even where they have the opportunity to do so, has a value
which is greater than the value of a merely accurate description of judicial behaviour in
a particular country. In particular, a case study is valuable where, as I shall go on to
argue, features of the case suggest that it is a crucial case, one where policy-seeking
behaviour is most likely.
Factors exacerbating/inhibiting political judging
In this section, I outline four factors which tend to exacerbate/inihibit political judging,
understood in the sense of policy-seeking voting: de jure/de facto judicial independence,
the court’s position within the legal and political system, norms of dissent, and legal
culture.
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The first factor is the degree of judicial independence, considered either in de jure or
de facto terms. The argument is that judges normally wish to vote sincerely for their
policy preferences, but also wish to avoid sanctions from governments that would react
negatively to a sincere vote. Consequently, since systems where judges enjoy a high
degree of independence from government are systems where governments have fewer
or less severe mechanisms for sanctioning judges, such systems should see higher lev-
els of political judging. Although some scholars define the ‘sanctioning cost’ restrictively
to include only the expected cost of sanctions from the incumbent government, incoming
governments occasionally show themselves to have long memories. Although the pre-
cise nature and strength of the link between de jure and de facto judicial independence
is unclear (Hayo and Voigt, 2007; Ros-Figueroa and Staton, 2012), systems with high
levels of both ought to have high levels of political judging, other things being equal.
The second factor is the position of the court within the legal and political system.
Courts, and a fortiori individual judges, care about the court’s perceived legitimacy. This
may either be their legitimacy as perceived by society at large (Gibson et al., 1998), or
by other judicial organs. Thus, judging in US state courts and federal district courts
is characterised less by policy-seeking than judging in the Supreme Court, because
judges lower in the hierarchy must anticipate the potential costs of their decision being
reversed (Songer et al., 1994). This argument can be extended to some apex courts,
since constitutional courts in the Kelsenian model often face competition from courts at
the top of the normal judicial hierarchy (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2012).
Third, we must consider norms of dissent within a particular legal system. In some
systems, or at some points in time in some systems, there is a strong norm against
dissenting opinions. In extremis, this can lead to dissenting opinions being forbidden, as
is the case with a number of Kelsenian constitutional courts, and the Irish SupremeCourt
when hearing constitutional cases. In less extreme scenarios, this may lead to courts
where dissent is too limited to permit inferences about judges’ ideal points, or where
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the propensity to dissent itself is the only signal amongst the noise (Hanretty, 2013). Of
course, to some extent a strong norm against dissent may be a post-hoc rationalisation,
due to the persistent risk of sanctions against judges who take iconoclastic stances. It is,
however, more difficult to argue that celebration of a pro-dissent norm is a rationalisation
of a low risk of sanctions.
The fourth and final factor concerns the legal culture, or the family of law practised. It
has sometimes been argued that common law systems, since they allow greater judicial
discretion, are more prone to dissent. However, it is not clear whether this argument
is really an argument about features inherent to the common law system, or rather an
argument about features inherent to its great contrast, code law systems. Certainly, the
great debate over legal families has not really clarified much, and now rather disabuses
the notion that legal families structure all aspects of law (Siems, 2007).
Having outlined a number of factors which might inhibit or exacerbate political judging,
I can now turn to the Estonian context, and make the case for considering it as a crucial
case for the view that judges may generally be considered as policy-seekers.
The Estonian context
The Estonian Supreme Court, or Riigikohus, is the highest court in Estonia. It func-
tions both as a constitutional court and as a court of cassation. In this respect it differs
from other apex courts in Central and Eastern Europe, which are typically dedicated
constitutional courts. It resembles more closely courts in common law legal systems.
This is because the Supreme Court is the successor to the original Supreme Court
established in October 1919 as a court of cassation only, following the Estonian war of
independence. Although the court was abolished following Soviet occupation, it was
reconstituted with the ratification of the Estonian constitution in June 1992 (Supreme
Court of Estonia, 2011, 28-30). There is, therefore, some sense in which the Supreme
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Court antedates the Kelsenian trend for separate constitutional courts.
The internal structure of the court reflects the dual nature of the court. There are
three ‘ordinary’ chambers (Criminal, Civil, and Administrative), and one slightly larger
Constitutional Review chamber. The court hears more controversial cases, including
more controversial constitutional review cases, en banc.
The Court consists of nineteen judges, including the Chief Justice. According to Ar-
ticle 150 of the constitution, the Chief Justice is appointed by the Parliament upon the
proposal of the President of the Republic; and ordinary members of the court are in turn
appointed by the Parliament upon the proposal of the Chief Justice. The Parliament, af-
ter a report by its Constitution Committee, decides by simple majority whether or not to
appoint the nominated judge. Most candidates are approved by substantial majorities.
Judges are appointed for life (Art. 147, §1, Constitution), and may not be removed
except by a court decision. Judges have retired from the court; have left the court either
for personal reasons (Tiit Kollom); and have left in order to to take up posts in other
institutions (Julia Laffranque and Uno Lohmus both became judges at the European
Court of Human Rights).
Requirements for eligibility are set out in Art. 47 (general) and 52 (Supreme Court-
specific) of the Courts Act 2002, according to which judges must be “experienced and
recognized lawyers” (Art. 52), and may not be members of a political party, or members
of Parliament. Despite the requirement that nominees be experienced and recognized
lawyers, the average age of the court is considerably lower than other comparable courts
in the region. This results in part from a ban on nominees older than 67 years old. In part
it seems to result from a preference for younger nominees: Villu Kove and Ivo Pilving
were both in their early thirties when appointed.
Cases1 arrive at the Court by one of five routes (Maveety and Pettai, 2005, 94,112).
First, casesmay be appealled from inferior courts. Second, legislationmay be referred to
the court by the President of the Republic. Third, legislation may be referred to the court
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by the Legal Chancellor, an ombudsman-like figure who is non-partisan, but who may be
petitioned by members of parliament. Fourth, international treaties may be referred to
the court by the Riigikogu. Fifth, following the passage of the 2002 Constitutional Review
Court Procedure Act, individuals or political parties engaged in electoral disputes may
also petition the court.
Dissenting opinions on the court (eriarvamus) are permitted by §§26-27 of the Court’s
Rules of Procedure. Once a rapporteur has been assigned a case, s/he will draw up
a list of itemized questions which must be answered in order to dispose of the case,
along with an indication of position the rapporteur believes should be taken. These
questions, and potential answers, are discussed and voted upon by judges hearing the
case, following which members dissatisfied with the majority judgement are given time
to file a dissenting opinion. Dissenting opinions are not just restricted to the Supreme
Court, but are present throughout the court system.
The Estonian Supreme Court in perspective
Given the factors identified above as exacerbating or inhibiting political judging, should
we expect political judging on the Estonian Supreme Court? I would suggest that we
should. This is because the court enjoys a high degree of independence (both de jure
and de facto); because the court operates at the top of the judicial hierarchy; because
there is no anti-dissent norm. Only in one respect – the prevailing legal culture – should
we expect lower levels of political judging due to limited judicial discretion.
Consider first the degree of independence of the court. Ros-Figueroa and Staton
(2012) consider twelve different measures of de facto and de jure independence. Of
these, four (de jure and de facto measures from Feld and Voigt (2003); de facto mea-
sures from Howard and Carey (2003) and Keith (2002)) deal explicitly with the highest
court. For these measures, subsetting (1) to the years 1994 to the latest year for which
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data was available for each country, and (2) to the countries of the EU27, plus the USA,
Estonia ranked 12th (USA: 11th); joint 11th (USA: 13th); joint 24th (USA: joint 1st with 23
other countries); and joint 17th (USA: 22nd) respectively. Thus, if levels of (de jure and
de facto) judicial independence on the Supreme Court of the United States are sufficient
for political judging, they ought also to be sufficient for the Estonian Supreme Court.
Second, because the Estonian Supreme Court operates at the top of the judicial hier-
archy, it does not face the problems of having tomoderate in order to secure co-operation
from parallel courts. Only by considering the position of the Estonian Supreme Court
vis-a-vis either the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights
as analogous to the position of circuit courts vis-a-vis SCOTUS could one argue that
political judging in the Estonian Supreme Court might be inhibited; but this argument (a)
grossly exaggerates the role of the ECJ vis-a-vis national courts, and (b) would in any
case have to be pursued carefully, for in general, agents faced with multiple principals
find it easier to ‘shirk’.
Third, there is a strong awareness of the benefits of dissenting opinions, and this ap-
plies throughout the judicial hierarchy. This is rare throughout Central and Eastern Eu-
rope: Lithuania and Slovakia did not initially permit the publication of dissenting opinions;
and Latvia and Hungary permit dissenting opinions only in their constitutional courts.
Judges on the Estonian Supreme Court have published strong arguments in favour of
the dissenting opinion (Laffranque, 2003; Kergandberg, 1998). There is no evidence to
suggest that there is a general norm against authoring dissenting opinions.
The fourth and final factor concerns the legal family. Only in this respect might we see
reasons for not expecting political judging. Estonia inherited a socialist legal system,
and has gradually been moving towards, or perhaps returning to, a German-inspired
legal system based around extensive definition of terms (Luts, 2001). To the extent
that such a legal system might be thought antithetical to political judging (and Honnige
(2009) suggests it is not), we might expect either such low levels of dissent as to make
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impossible the drawing of reliable inferences concerning judges’ ideal points, or the
confining of such disagreement as exists to minor matters.
Data and analysis
Whilst the previous section adumbrated certain data relating to the Estonian Supreme
Court, in this section I outline the characteristics of the data I use on dissenting opin-
ions, and how this data can be analysed using a ‘vanilla’ ideal-point model. Only in the
next section do I show that the results from this ideal point model, whilst substantively
interesting, do not support an interpretation of the recovered dimension as a ‘political’
dimension.
The data I use cover the period from 1993 until the end of 2010. Specifically, I examine
the 120 cases that featured at least one dissenting opinion. I concentrate on dissenting
cases only because information on unanimous opinions provides no information as to
the different stances (ideological or otherwise) of the judges, absent a strong theory
about what constitutes, for example, a ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ decision.
The average number of cases involving dissent per year was around 7, which means
that given the Court’s average annual caseload of around 367 cases only around 1.7%
of cases featured a dissent. This percentage seems to be increasing over time, though it
is not clear whether this apparent trend results from lower levels of dissent in the Court’s
early years, or whether we can expect rates of dissent to continue growing.
This percentage figure is calculated on the basis of all cases heard by the Court in a
given year, although this is somewhat misleading in that most dissents are given in the
much smaller number of constitutional review cases or cases heard en banc. Of the 120
cases featured here, only 39 were heard in three-judge panels.
With two exceptions (Peeter Vaher and Mart Rask), all judges who have served on
the Court have dissented at some point in time. Three judges (Rait Maruste, Herbert
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Lindmae, and Tiit Kollom) dissented only once, though Tiit Kollom only heard a very few
cases on the court before resigning for family reasons. The most frequent dissenters
(Eerik Kerkandberg, Juri Pold and Jaak Luik) have all written or joined in with more than
twenty-five dissents.
This data can be put in to a data matrix, which has dimension i =120 by j =27, and
which represents a notional super-court, composed of all the judges. The entries in this
datamatrix may either indicate that in case i judge j concurred with themajority (yij = 1),
dissented from the majority (yij = 0), or did not participate (i.e., data is missing).
I analyse this data using item response methods. Item response methods can be
used wherever we believe that binary or ordinal responses to a battery of items can be
modelled as a function of an underlying trait, or position along a latent dimension, with
due allowance given for the position which those items have along that same dimension,
and the degree to which those items discriminate between those responding to our items
who have otherwise similar positions along that dimension. The most well known appli-
cation of this technique to judicial politics comes from the United States Supreme Court,
where the dissenting behaviour of US Supreme Court Justices has been analysed using
these techniques to generate estimates of judge’s ‘ideal points’ along a latent dimension
running from left to right, and commensurable in principle with the left right dimension
that structures US politics.
While such techniques are bound to produce a ‘position’ along a latent dimension for
each judge, there is no guarantee that (a) this method of analysing dissent will produce
results will fit well the observed data; or (b) that this position, or the underlying latent
dimension, will have a substantively meaningful interpretation. Thus, in an analysis of
voting behaviour in the British House of Lords, Hanretty (2013) found that analysing
the House of Lords in this data neither fitted well the data, nor gave a substantively
interesting interpretation: positions along the recovered latent dimension simply tracked
judges’ propensity to dissent.
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Consequently, the item response techniques used here are a necessary but not suffi-
cient part of the analysis. Although it is important to demonstrate that these techniques
produce estimates that fit the observed data, a second stage of qualitative analysis must
be carried out in order to identify the meaning of these numbers.
With these qualifications out of the way, we can proceed to specifying the model more
formally. I follow the notation before, where i indexes cases, j judges, and where yij is
the judge j’s vote on case i. Let each judge’s position along the latent dimension be j .
Let each case have two parameters – a location parameter, i, and a discrimination
parameter, i. Of these two, the discrimination parameter is the more important for our
analysis. Cases with a discrimination parameter which is significantly different from zero
will be cases that separate otherwise-close judges, and which therefore offer an insight
into the meaning othe recovered dimension.
Using this notation, we may model the probability of voting with the majority is
Pr(yij = 1) = F ( i + ij)
where F is the normal cumulative distribution function. Thus, for caseswith a positively-
valued , judges with larger values of  will be more likely to concur; conversely, for
cases with a negatively valued , judges with larger values of  will be less likely to
concur.
We can produce estimates of this model given an estimation technique, and certain
constraints on some of the parameters. I estimate this model using Monte Carlo Markov
Chain (MCMC) models.2 These models require additional checks to ensure that our
estimates of the different parameters have converged. Here, I base my estimates on
1750000 iterations preceded by 250000 burn-in iterations, and thinned every 250 itera-
tions. The model run came close to convergence, since the value of Geweke’s diagnos-
tic for the parameters on judges’ ideal points had a mean of 0.11 with 95% quantiles in
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the range [ -1.93, 2.38 ] , close to the critical range of 1:96.
Constraints must be imposed on some of the parameters, because the likelihood of
the model is unchanged if all of the estimates are either shifted by a particular constant,
or if they are scaled by some constant. I therefore normalize the ideal points to have
zero mean and unit standard deviation. This deals with the problem of scale invariance,
but leaves the problem of rotational invariance. Thus, there is no information within the
model which tells us which end of the recovered dimension corresponds to a particular
substantively interesting aspect of judging. This is why we must first begin with the
recovered dimension before moving on to a qualitative analysis.
[Table 1 about here.]
A number of statistics concerning the overall fit of the model are presented in Table
1. As is normal for models of this type, the percentage of decisions ‘predicted’ correctly
is quite high, at 86.34, but this averages out greater predictive accuracy for concurring
opinions and poorer predictive accuracy for dissenting opinions. A null model which
only predicted concurrences would still predict a high number of decisions correctly. An
overall assessment of the fit of the model is given by the geometric mean probability, or
GMP. The GMP ranges between zero and one; values of 0.5 indicate that the predictive
ability of the model is comparable to a coin toss. Here, the value of 0.74 indicates that
the model fits the data reasonably well.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Of course, we are estimating this model to also extract information about the location
of judges along some idealized dimension of judicial decision-making rather than to
retrodict decisions. Figure 1 plots the location of each of the judges along the recovered
dimension, and their associated 95% credible intervals. Credible intervals are larger for
judges who heard relatively few cases. Thus, considerable uncertainty surrounds the
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placement of Tiit Kollom, who only heard a few cases before retiring from the Court for
family reasons.
How to interpret the recovered dimension
In the previous section, I suggested that judges on the Estonian Supreme Court could be
arrayed on a single, ‘latent’, dimension, which could be used to retrodict a high number
of decisions in cases involving dissent. However, the fact that we can array judges on
such a latent dimension does not mean that this dimension has any substantive meaning
that we can readily interpret. It might merely be a statistical artefact.
In this section, I shall discuss two possible interpretations of the recovered dimension:
that it reflects the identity and interests of those involved in appointing each justice to
the court; and that it reflects judges’ different preferences over the outcomes of legal
disputes, in particular ‘plaintiff-friendliness’.
Appointment offers no guide
One important way of testing for political judging is to test for a correlation between
the position of the actor or actors who appointed each judge, and some outcome or
measure attributable to that judge. Concerning outcomes, Honnige (2009) has tested
the link between the ascribed political position of the median judge on the French and
German Constitutional Courts, and the likelihood of an ideologically distant or proximate
government succeeding in those court. Concerning measures, the debate in the United
States about the link between the left-right positions of Presidents and the positions of
their nominees concerns not whether there is such a link, but whether it holds (1) across
all appointments or only over distal appointments (Krehbiel, 2007); and (2) across time,
as nominees drift (Honnige, 2009).
Here, I examine the correlation between the estimated ideal points of judges, and
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the left-right positions of the appointing actors. Because the direction of the recovered
dimension is arbitrary, what matters is the significance of the correlation: to the extent
that there is a significant correlation, we presume that the relationship is correctly signed.
When considering the left-right position of the appointing actors, we may either consider,
for Chief Justices, the left-right position of the appointing President, and assume that this
is transmitted faithfully through the subsequent nominations of Chief Justices appointed
by that President, or the left right position of the median legislator at the time of each
appointment.3
I do not consider more sophisticated models of appointment, because there is very
little evidence for any kind of relationship, even an attenuated one. The correlation
between the left-right position of the median legislator and the position on the recovered
dimension of each judge is small and insignificant (r= -0.04, p = 0.86) . The correlation
between the left-right position of the appointing President (for Chief Justices) or the
appointing Chief Justice (ascribed the position of the appointing President) and the same
judge positions is also small and insignificant (r= -0.11, p = 0.58) .
Liberal and conservative outcomes
A second approach to demonstrating ‘political judging’ is to code case outcomes as ei-
ther being left-wing or right-wing outcomes: in North American terminology, as liberal
or conservative outcomes. As Maveety and Pettai (2005, 113n14) note, such exercises
are difficult because “it is [not] transparently obvious how to code a ‘liberal’ or a ‘conser-
vative’ judicial response to various issues”. Nevertheless, some tentative approaches
have been made.
Here, I have used information on the broad legal area, coded following the dictionary
supplied by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. For each of these legal areas,
I have indicated whether a victory for the plaintiff would represent a liberal outcome.
In this I have been guided by the practice not only of the US-specific Supreme Courts
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Database, but also the comparative common law High Courts Judicial Database. A full
list of legal areas where victories for the plaintiff correspond to liberal, conservative and
neutral outcomes is found in the Appendix. Some of these codings are more easily ap-
preciated than others. Thus, the ‘right for life’ case area, in so far as it relates to abortion
and end-of-life issues, is often associated with particular conservative religious world-
views about the sanctity of life. Conversely, the ‘collective rights’ and ‘Social security’
case areas are associated with a left-wing political philosophy which pursues redistribu-
tion through collective bargaining and a broad welfare state.
However, a number of codings rely on broad principles which are the result of common
North American practice. Thus, whilst the content of a general right not to incriminate
oneself is neither obviously ‘left’ or ‘right’, its coding as a ‘liberal’ case area (that is, a
case area in which a victory for the plaintiff would indicate a liberal outcome) is based on
the finding that ‘liberal’ judges in the United States tend to be more lenient towards those
suspected of having committed crimes. Thus, to the extent that some of these codings
are controversial, I trust that they are controversial for the same reasons that standard
practice is controversial, not because of any additional element that I have added.
If case outcomes can be coded in this way, we may ask whether there is any relation-
ship between the case outcome and the ideal points of the judges, as shown in Figure
1. One way of testing this is to cross-tabulate liberal outcomes against the ‘handedness’
of the majority on the court. A ‘left-handed’ decision is one where the majority of the
court was to the left of the minority on the court. A ‘right-handed’ decision is simply the
converse.
[Table 2 about here.]
As can be seen from Table 2, there is no strong relationship between the liberality or
conservative character of a case outcome, and the ‘handedness’ of the majority. There
are more ‘conservative’ outcomes in general, but the cell counts are almost exactly as
we would expect given the marginal distributions (2 = 0.02)
16
Plaintiff-friendliness
If there is no relationship between the left-right positions of those who appointed the
judges, and the positions of these judges, and if there is no relationship between the
positions of the judges in the majority and the type of outcome delivered, what does
explain the nature of the recovered dimension? Here, I argue that the single dimension
which separates judges on the Supreme Court has to do with their orientation towards
the arguments made by plaintiffs alleging infringement of their rights.
Specifically, I argue that judges towards the right-hand side of the recovered dimen-
sion (Pold, Laffranque, Salmann, Koolmeister) are more likely to have come from an
administrative law tradition, and are therefore more likely to evaluate claims of constitu-
tional rights infringement not by challenging the presumed right, but by evaluating the
proportionality of the government action. Conversely, those on the left hand side of the
recovered dimension are much less likely to find that government action or legislative
provisions are unconstitutional since in violation of constitutional rights.
[Table 3 about here.]
We can get a first approximation to this argument by examining some of the statistics
on outcomes according to the identity of the winning party. Table 3 shows the identity of
the winning party to the case, according to the ‘handedness’ of the majority on the court.
The key difference is that, when judges in the right-hand side are in the majority, more
than half of cases are won by plaintiffs. Only three-tenths of cases are won by plaintiffs
when judges in the left-hand side are in the majority. These differences are significant
at the 10% level (2 = 5.82 on 2 d.f., p = 0.05).
A second approximation comes from the positions of the judges according to the
chamber in which they hear most cases. As should be evident from Figure 1, judges
from the right hand side of the recovered dimension are much more likely to come from
the administrative law chamber. The posterior probability that judges from the adminis-
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trative chamber are further to the right hand side of the recovered dimension than judges
from any other chamber approaches 100%.
Finally, the importance of this kind of plaintiff friendliness also emerges when examin-
ing particular cases. Here, I limit my analysis to all those cases which discriminated with
respect to the recovered dimension (56 cases in total), and which have been translated
in to English by the court.
The best example of plaintiff-friendliness concerns prisoners’ access to web sites (RK
3-3-1-5-09). In this case, plaintiff Romeo Kalda argued that the refusal of the Tartu prison
to ensure him access to the website of the Council of Europe Information Office in Tallinn,
the parliament web-site, and the site of the Chancellor of Justice, constituted a violation
of his right to public information found in §44(1) of the Constitution. The majority of
the court (drawn from the left-hand side of the recovered dimension) dismissed Kalda’s
appeal, finding that whilst the ban on internet access to these sites did constitute an
infringement of Kalda’s constitutional rights, the infringement was proportionate, insofar
as it aimed at the objective of prevent misuse of the internet by prisoners, and insofar
as alternatives (writing to the Council of Europe, obtaining documents on request) were
available. Theminority of the court (judges Anton, Koolmeister, Pold, and Salmann) took
the majority to task for failing to seriously examine the proportionality of the infringement
– how viable were the alternatives? how realistic was the threat of misuse from allowing
access to such sites? At one level, therefore, this case reveals a disagreement about
the intensity of review when the proportionality of rights infringements is in question. At
another, more simplistic level, this case reveals a difference in plaintiff-friendliness, in
that plaintiffs are typically beneficiaries of demanding standards of proportionality.
Further evidence for these differences comes from a series of cases concerning provi-
sions of the Traffic Act. The issue in these cases concerned whether sanctions given for
traffic offences were of sufficient gravity that they would cease to bemeremisdemeanour
proceedings and would become proper hearings involving a right for the relevant indi-
18
vidual to defend himself/herself. The majority of the court was reluctant to declare any
part of the Traffic Act unconstitutional; the minority, mostly drawn from the Administrative
Chamber, insisted that these sanctions very often touched on important constitutionally
guaranteed rights such as the right to family life and the right to freedom of movement,
and that the efficiency of driving licence administration was not to trump the rights of
individuals to defend themselves.
In both of these examples, a minority of the court drawn from the right-hand side of
the recovered dimension intervened on behalf of law-breakers. However, this plaintiff-
friendliness is not just restricted to plaintiffs of certain types. This same group of judges
has also defended the property rights of collectives in re-nationalisation cases (RK 3-
2-1-59-04), and in the process of defending businessman Tiit Veeber (RK 3-3-2-1-04),
called for much stronger procedures to protect individuals who had secured a ruling from
the ECHR that their rights had been violated (justices Pold, Luik).
Conclusion
In this article I have demonstrated that there is a substantively interesting pattern of dis-
sent on the Estonian Supreme Court which is not political in nature. Rather, it relates to
differences between the judges about the proper way of evaluating the claims of plain-
tiffs, with judges on one side preferring to take plaintiffs’ claims of rights infringements as
valid on the face of it, and then establish the proportionality of the alleged infringement,
and judges on the other side preferring to reject such claims.
By doing so, I have provided a counter-example to the common presumption that
judicial disagreement is either conflictual and political, or minimal. I have also argued
that this finding is not inert: there are good theoretical reasons for thinking that policy-
seeking judging ought to be present in Estonia.
Naturally, the question arises as to why policy-seeking judging is not present despite
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high levels of judicial independence and an appreciation of the dissenting opinion. One
possible answer lies in the method by which judges are appointed. Two factors are im-
portant: the method of appointing as and when vacancies arise, and the involvement
of the judiciary. I have argued elsewhere that multi-member appointments result in
the creation of a package of appointments the median point of which is approximately
‘balanced’, but which is characterised by wide dispersion. By contrast, sequential ap-
pointments force appointing bodies to appoint each judge at a median point, and thus,
since they cannot shift policy, prioritise quality.
Second, whilst the involvement of the judiciary has not led to depoliticisation in Italy,
Bulgaria, or Romania, the degree to which appointments to the court are driven by merit
rather than completion of a cursus honorum is, at least in comparison with countries like
the United Kingdom, most admirable. It is difficult to foresee whether the current mem-
bership of the court will engage in more political behaviour as they enter their second
or third decades on the court – but any test of this would at least have to part from the
presumption that non-political judicial disagreement is a possible, if aberrant or fleeting
condition.
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A. Areas by outcome type
‘Liberal’ case areas Victory for plaintiff in these areas treated as a liberal outcome.
Criminal proceedings, Deprivation of liberty, Rights of the child, Consumer protection,
Citizens of the European Union and non-citizens with similar status, Inviolability of com-
munications, Right to a pension, Principle of the application of the more lenient law,
Right to private life, Procedural safeguards, rights of the defence and fair trial, Free-
dom to choose one’s profession, Right not to incriminate oneself, Prohibition of torture
and inhuman and degrading treatment, Economic, social and cultural rights, Right to a
sufficient standard of living, Right to be informed about the decision, Right to the envi-
ronment, Freedom of opinion, Individual liberty, Right to paid legal assistance, Collective
rights, Right to citizenship or nationality, Rights in respect of the audiovisual media and
other means of mass communication, Freedom of the written press, Social security,
Right to just and decent working conditions, Entitlement to rights, Equality
‘Conservative’ case areas Victory for plaintiff in these areas treated as a conservative
outcome.
Right to participate in the administration of justice, Right to compensation for damage
caused by the State, Market economy, Freedom of contract, Right to respect for one’s
honour and reputation, Right to administrative transparency, Right to property, Nation-
alisation, Freedom to work for remuneration, Arrangements for distributing the financial
resources of the State, Commercial and industrial freedom, Expropriation, Taxation law,
Rights of victims of crime, Right to life
‘Neutral’ case areas Victory for plaintiff in these areas treated as neither a liberal
nor a conservative outcome. Elections and instruments of direct democracy, Scope of
review, National rules, Civil law, Constitutional jurisdiction, Non-penal measures, Bud-
getary and financial aspects, Proportionality, Trial/decision within reasonable time, Crim-
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inal law, Reasoning, Vested and/or acquired rights, Municipalities, Right to information,
Reasonableness, Civil proceedings, Certainty of the law, Ne bis in idem, Clarity and
precision of legal provisions, Non-retrospective effect of law, European Charter of Lo-
cal Self-Government of 1985, Access to courts, Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege,
Foreigners, Legality, Rules of evidence, Employment, Privatisation, , Constitution, Na-
tionals, Scope of application, Concept of constitutionality dependent on a specified in-
terpretation, Right of access to administrative documents, Public judgments, Liability
of judges, Supervision, Term of office of members, Electoral rights, Right to exam-
ine witnesses, Protection of personal data, Appointment of members, Double degree
of jurisdiction, Rule of law, Hierarchy, Jurisdiction, Prohibition of arbitrariness, Scope,
Language, In public law, Right of access to the public service, Right to work, Right to
participate in public affairs, Right to be informed about the charges, National rules from
other countries, Right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the case,
Concept of manifest error in assessing evidence or exercising discretion, Legal assis-
tance and representation of parties, Correspondence, Legal persons, Presumption of
innocence, End, Weighing of interests, Right to stand for election, Succession, Margin
of appreciation, European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, Right of access to the
file, 5.13.18, Hierarchy as between national sources
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Notes
1 As distinct from disputes concerning the status of members of the Riigikogu or the
Riigikogu’s rules of procedure.
2 Specifically, I use Simon Jackman’s pscl package for R.
3 Data for the left-right positions of legislators and presidents are taken from www.ParlGov.org.
Lennart Meri is ascribed the left-right position of Pro Patria; Arnold Ruutel the position
of the Estonian Centre Party (Eesti Keskerakond).
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Table 1: Measures of fit
Item Statistic
Percentage correctly predicted 86.34
‘Concurring’ votes correctly predicted 96.24













Table 3: Victories for plaintiff by majority
LHS RHS
Respondent 8 11
Neither 22 19
Plaintiff 13 33
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